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EMPLOYMENT, SEXUAL ORIENTATION, AND
RELIGIOUS BELIEFS: Do RELIGIOUS EDUCATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS HAVE A PROTECTED RIGHT TO
DISCRIMINATE IN THE SELECTION AND DISCHARGE
OF EMPLOYEES?
Ralph D. Mawdsley*

I. INTRODUCTION

The life blood of religious educational institutions is their
doctrinal statements and codes of conduct that set standards
for employee and student life. The purpose of this paper is to
examine the freedom of religious educational institutions to
make employment decisions related to three homosexualityrelated areas: sexual orientation, same-sex sexual activity
outside marriage, and same-sex marriage. At the core of the
discussion is the basic question whether religious educational
institutions have a protected right to enforce doctrinal
statements or codes of conduct addressing one or more of these
areas.
This paper will examine legal issues related to the ability of
religious educational institutions to declare and enforce their
religious beliefs regarding same-sex relationships. This
discussion involves a balancing of important interests. On one
side is the interest of government in prohibiting discrimination,
retaliation, and harassment against persons engaged in
protected activity. On the other side are the free exercise, free
speech and expressive association rights of religious
educational institutions to express and enforce their religious
beliefs.

* Ralph D. Mawdsley, .J.D., Ph.D., is Professor and the Roslyn Z. Wolf Endowed Chair
in Urban Educational Leadership at Cleveland State University, Cleveland, Ohio.
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II. MARRIAGE AS A RELIGIOUS BELIEF
Religious
educational
institutions
routinely
make
employment decisions relating to religious beliefs. Depending
on the nature of the beliefs, those decisions may be grounded in
immutable theological principles found in doctrinal statements
or in codes of conduct addressing appropriate relationships
between employees and their work, their students, and their
families. 1 While religious beliefs in doctrinal statements, such
as the Trinity, inerrancy of Scripture, and the virgin birth, are
considered to be the theological bedrock of a religious
institution, codes of conduct are the moral compass for day-byday living. Both are equally important and relevant in defining
the religious beliefs of an educational institution. For the
purpose of this paper, doctrinal statements and codes of
conduct will be considered to be equally important in framing
the religious nature of a religious educational institution.
Thus, the question concerning homosexuality and religious
beliefs is whether either a doctrinal statement or a code of
conduct addresses issues relating to one or more of the three
homosexuality-related areas-sexual orientation, sexuality
activity outside marriage, and same-sex marriage. While a
cognizable argument can be made for including different-sex
marriage as a fundamental religious belief in a doctrinal
statement,Z few educational institutions appear to have done so
and have chosen instead to address only out-of-wedlock sexual
activity. 3

1. Codes of conduct can be extraordinarily broad and can include not only
acceptable movies, music and clothing, but appropriate course content.
2. See Genesis 2:24 ("Therefore shall a man shall leave his Father and Mother
and shall cleave to his wife and they shall one flesh."); f~phesians 5:25 ("Husbands, love
your wives even as Christ loved the church and gave himself for it."); Exodus 20:11
("Thou shall not commit adultery."); 1 Thessalonians 1::3-1 ("For this is the will of God,
even your sanctification, that ye should abstain from fornication: That every one of you
should know how to possess his vessel in sanctification and honor."). Fornication
includes any physical intimacy outside marriage including both homost~xuality and any
cohabitation or living together outside marriage. For reference to same-sex
relationships, see Romans 1:21-:!2.
3. For an extensive statement of religious beliefs, albeit one not mentioning
marriage, see the Doctrinal Statement for Liberty University, which advertises itself as
"the world's largest Christian university." The only veiled rcfcnmce to relationships is
in the LU Distinctives where the University prohibits certain, "Behavioral standards ..
. including the prohibition of drug, alcohol and tobacco use, cued residence halls, and
sexual promiscuity." (emphasis added) Liberty University Distinctivf's, LIIIERTY
UNIVERSITY, https:l/www.liberty.edu/index.cfm?l'ID=6909 (last visited Sept. 5, 2010).
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As will be seen from the following legal discussion in this
article, religious educational institutions have two major
responsibilities if they are to be successful in enforcing their
religious beliefs. First, they must have a clear understanding of
the theological and moral beliefs of their institutions. Second,
they must have an organized program of orientation for
imparting these beliefs to employees (and students). Legal
protection for religious beliefs will occur either through
statutory exemptions or through constitutional rights.

III. RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND STATUTORY EXEMPTIONS
In April 2009, a Florida religious school teacher's contract
was terminated following the disclosure, during her request for
maternity leave, that while employed as a teacher she had
conceived a child three weeks prior to her marriage. Allegedly
notified in her termination letter that she was being dismissed
for "fornication" pursuant to a school morals clause requiring
employees to "maintain and communicate the values and
purpose of [a religious elementary/secondary school]," the
teacher responded by engaging an attorney. Her attorney
expressed the teacher's claim under a state statute prohibiting
marital status discrimination 4 as follows, "If they (school
officials) [are] going to single her out because she conceived
prior to marriage, but allow people to remain employed who
conceived during marriage, isn't that discriminating against
her based on her marital status?" 5 In effect, the dispute arises
between conduct the religious employer considers to be morally
reprehensible (fornication) and conduct the dismissed teacher
considers to be protected under a state statute prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of marital status.
Although lacking in detail, the facts of the dispute indicate
how legal rights can be used in creative ways to challenge
religious beliefs that clergy and governing bodies in religious
educational institutions may have thought were manifestly
clear. While not addressing homosexuality under any of the
three same-sex areas, the facts do expose legal trip wires

1. See FLA. STAT. § 760.10 (2001) (prohibiting employment discrimination under
a variety of categories, including marital status).
5. Fla.
Christian School Fires Teacher Ouer 'Fornication' Claims,
FOXNEWS.COM. Jun. 9, 2010, http://www.foxnews.com/us/201 0/06/09/fla-christianschool-fires- teacher-fornication -claims/.

282

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2011

encountered when claims are made under statutes prohibiting
discrimination.
Defenses available to religious educational institutions
when charged with discrimination fall into two broad
categories: statutory exemptions and constitutional rights.
While many states prohibit discrimination based on sexual
orientation, the federal government has yet to legislate such
protection. Nonetheless, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 6 the workhorse of discrimination litigation, contains
exemptions applying to religious institutions which would,
presumably, also protect those institutions if Title VII were
amended to include sexual orientation.
Title VII contains three exemptions applicable to religious
educational institutions. The first exempts employment
decisions where "religion IS a bona fide occupational
qualification [BFOQ] of that particular business or
enterprise." 7 The second exempts religious institutions where
"the curriculum of such [institution] is directed toward the
propagation of a particular religion."g The third exempts
religious institutions where employment by a religious
educational institution of persons of a particular religion is
necessary "to perform work connected with the carrying on by
such ... educational institution ... of its activities." 9
While these exemptions appear quite exhaustive, federal
courts frequently are called upon to determine whether
religious beliefs (relating to BFOQ, curriculum, activities)
should be exempt where they otherwise discriminate against
other protected categories. In Vigars v. Valley Christian Center
of Dublin, 10 a California federal district court held that a
religious school librarian-discharged for an out-of-wedlock
pregnancy by the person who eventually become her second
husband, but occurring while she was still married to her first
husband-was entitled to go to trial under a Title VII gender
discrimination claim. The librarian had received a handbook

6. Title Vll makes it unlawful "to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin .... " 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2010).
7. /d. § 2000e-2(c)(1).
8. !d. § 2000c-2(c)(2).
9. !d.§ 2000c-l(a).
10. 805 F. Supp. 802 (N.D. Cal. 1992).

2]

EMPLOYMENT, SEXUAL ORIENTATION

283

that "detailed the school's and church's mission, her role in that
mission as mentor and role model, and repeatedly stressed that
employees of the school were required to live a life in
conformity with the fundamentalist beliefs of the church." 11
The school's effort to justify the discharge initially on the basis
of pregnancy out-of-wedlock and then, on appeal, to use the
religious grounds of adultery, prompted the district court to
note that, even though "defendants' dislike of pregnancy
outside of marriage stem[ed] from a religious belief may be
relevant to the Court's First Amendment analysis, it [did] not
automatically exempt the termination decision from Title VII
scrutiny." 12 The court found that neutral, generally applicable
prohibition of gender discrimination under Title VII preempted
defendants' use of the Free Exercise Clause 13 where "only
women can ever be fired for being pregnant without benefit of
marriage," 14 but the court went on to note that had the school
raised only the adultery charge, such would have been
"determinative of whether Title VII applies to this case." 15 In
this judicial dividing-the-baby analysis, the federal district
court observed that not all religious beliefs will be enforced
equally. Other courts have taken the same approach as in
Vigars, noting that employee discharge for "[engaging in] premarital sexual intercourse in violation of [a school's] moral
code" would not be a Title VII discrimination violation, while a
discharge based on pregnancy would be a violation. 16 Thus,
while courts expound the dogma that "[i]nquiry by the courts
into the religious faith required by a religious organization of
its employees is constitutionally barred," 17 courts can, and do,

11. ld. at 801. The district court rejected the school"s "bona fide occupational
qualification [BFOQJ" Title VII exemption (20 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(l) (2010)) in terms of
the librarian being a "role model" where "there [was] a serious disagreement about how
central her moral life was to her job as librarian, whether or not she was truly expected
to act as a role model ... and what impact her pregnancy truly had on her ability to
perform either of those functions." !d. at 809.
12. !d. at 808.
13. See Emp't Div. v. Smith, 191 U.S. 872, 880 (1990) (upholding state's denial of
unemployment compensation to two former state employees fired for using the banned
drug peyote, allegedly for religious purposes, where the state statute criminalizing the
usc of peyote was a "neutral, generally applicable regulatory law").
11. Vigars, 805 F. Supp. at 8(11.
15. ld.at810.
16. E.g, Dolter v. Wahlert High Sch., 48:3 F. Supp. 266,270 (N.D. Iowa 1980).
17. Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 941, 9-17 (:3d Cir.l991).
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inquire into whether marriage-related employment criteria are
implemented in a manner that is prohibited under Title VII. 18
Other Title VII cases involving marriage issues have
involved, as discussed above, the same kind of balancing of
religious beliefs with Title VII's prohibition of protected
category discrimination. In Little u. Wuerl, 19 the teaching
contract of a Protestant teacher in a Catholic school was not
renewed "because she had remarried ... without pursuing the
'proper canonical process available from the Roman Catholic
Church to obtain validation of her second marriage."' 20 The
Cardinal's Clause, in effect at the teacher's school, required
the dismissal of [a] teacher for serious public immorality,
public scandal or public rejection of the official teachings,
doctrine or laws of the Catholic Church. Examples of the
violation of this clause would be the entry by a teacher into a
marriage which ~s not recognized by the Catholic
Church ... .21

The Third Circuit, relying on a Title VII exemption for
religious educational institutions whose practices are "directed
toward the propagation of a particular religion," 22 ruled in
Little that the school's having hired plaintiff knowing that she
was a Protestant had not served to waive the exemption as to
the school's enforcement of its religious beliefs concerning
marriage. The school in Little clearly benefited from a
statement of its religious beliefs regarding marriage and
changed the whole focus of the decision from discrimination to
the terms of the employee's contract.

18. Compare Cline v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo, 206 F.:ld 651, 6G6 (Gth Cir. 2000)
(emphasizing that, where a female employee is discharged or nonrenewed for
premarital sex, her prima facie case requires only that she produce evidence that,
apart from the premarital sex issue, "she was meeting [her employer's] legitimate
expectations;" the burden then shifts to the school to produce evidence of its religious
beliefs as a nondiscriminatory basis for its decision; whether employee is able to
produce evidence that the proffered reason is pretextual will affect the outcome of the
case, but is not part of the employee's prima facie case) with Boyd v. Harding Acad. of
Memphis, 88 F.:id 410 (6th Cir. 1996) (upholding summary judgment for a religious
school regarding its termination of an unmarried pregnant preschool teacher where the
teacher was not able to refute the school's nondiscriminatory reason for discharge in
that it enforced its anti-adultery policy against both males and females).
19. 929 F.2d 94-1 (ad Cir. 1991).
20. !d. at 916.
21. !d.
22. 12 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(2) (2010).
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The Title VII religious exemptions have protected religious
educational institutions' enforcement of religious beliefs in
cases not directly related to marriage. For example, in CurayCramer u. Ursuline Academy of Wilmington, Delaware, Inc} 3
the Third Circuit upheld, against a claim of gender
discrimination, the discharge of a female Catholic school
teacher who had signed a public pro-abortion advertisement in
a
local
newspaper, reasoning that "the pro-choice
advertisement was not protected conduct under Title VII's
opposition clause." 24 In effect, in the absence of an allegation
that male employees had attacked the Catholic Church's
position on abortion and had been punished differently, a court
would be called upon to determine whether "the repudiation of
Catholic doctrine on when life begins and the responsibility to
preserve life in utero" 25 violates Catholic doctrine, something
that "would infringe upon the First Amendment Religion
clauses." 26 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit upheld, against a
claim of gender discrimination, the refusal of a Catholic
university to hire a female Catholic with strong pro-abortion
views for a theology position, reasoning that the same result
would have occurred for a male applicant. 27 In Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission u. Mississippi College, 28
the Fifth Circuit limited jurisdiction of the EEOC to inquire
into a Baptist institution's refusal to hire a Presbyterian,
female part-time instructor for a full-time position where the
College was owned by the state Baptist convention, the
College's employment requirements specified hiring of Baptists

23. 150 F.:3d 1ao, 112 (:ld Cir. 2006) (Curay-Cramer /I) (rejecting Title VII claims
hy terminated female Catholic school teacher and rejecting gender discrimination
based on male employees in the past having heen treated less severely for other kinds
of violations, the Third Circuit reasoning that "comparable conduct [must he]
sufficiently similar to avoid raising substantial [First Amendment Religious Clauses]
constitutional questions.").
21. Jd.
25. Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Acad. of Wilmington, Del., Inc., :!11 F. Supp. 2d
92:3, 931 (D. Del. 20(J1) (Curay-Cramer [).
26. Curay-Cramer 11, 150 F.:ld at 110.
27. Maguire v. Marquette Univ., 811 F.2d 1213 (7th Cir. 1987).
28. 626 F.2d 177 (5th Cir. 1980) (while not resolved on the merits, the Fifth
Circuit was clear that on remand the EEOC, once it had determined that the College
had a religion-based employment requirement, could not inquire further into other
discrimination claims).
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except in situations where none were available for critical
areas, and 95% of the faculty was Baptist. 29
One final exemption exists, although it takes its force from
the Free Exercise Clause rather than statutory exemptions.
Religious schools and universities can claim a ministerial
exemption under the Free Exercise Clause in making
employment decisions even though those decisions are
discriminatory, the rationale being that courts cannot inquire
into an institution's qualifications for those who perform
religious functions. However, this exemption is very narrowly
defined. 30
Religious exemptions from state nondiscrimination statutes
can involve difficult interpretative questions, not significantly
different from those under Title VII. In a student case, Romeo
u. Seton Hall Uniuersity, 31 a New Jersey appeals court held
that a Catholic university that denied recognition of a student
gay and lesbian group was not prohibited from doing so by the
state's nondiscrimination statute. New Jersey has a broad
nondiscrimination statute prohibiting discrimination on the
basis of a variety of categories, including "sexual orientation," 32
in "any college and university" 33 but exempting from that
statute "any educational facility operated or maintained by a
bona fide religious or sectarian institution." 34 Two judicial
observations regarding the facts of this case are worth noting.
First, the state appeals court observed that the university's
broad nondiscrimination provision, prohibiting discrimination
in employment and student programs in a variety of areas
including sexual orientation, 35 cannot be read as a contractual
29. The Fifth Circuit in Mississippi Colle!fe relied on the Title VII exemption
where "the employment of individuals of a particular religion [is necessaryj to perform
work connected with the carrying on by such ... educational institution ... of its
activities." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (a) (2010).
30. Compare Hedhead v. Conf. of Seventh-day Adventists, -140 F. Supp. 2d 211
(E.D.N. Y. 2006) (finding that termination of pregnant female not protected by
ministerial exemption where teacher's duties were secular in nature) with Petruska v.
Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2006) (ministerial exemption applied in gender
discrimination claim where plaintiffs position was that of a chaplain at a religious
university).
31. 875 A.2d 1013 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005).
32. N .•J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-::l (West 2006).
::3:3. Jd. § 10:5-5(1).
34. /d.
35. Romeo, 875 A2d at 1048. The university's nondiscrimination provision is a
fairly standard one: "No person may be denied employment or related benefits or
admission to the University or to any of its programs or activities, either academic or
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exemption from the state statute. In distinguishing
nondiscrimination contract provisions in employment from
student organizations, the appeals court refused to recognize a
nondiscrimination provision creating a unilateral contract for
students and, even if such were to exist, the provision in the
Seton Hall Student Handbook declared that student clubs,
organizations, and associations could only be formed that
"respect[ed] the values and mission of the University." 36
Second, the court held that "a private religious university's
values and mission must be left to the discretion of the
university." 37 The plaintiff students' emphasis on forming an
organization directed at one protected class amounted to a
"reductionist reference to ... sexual orientation" 38 which was
inconsistent with the Church's position "that every person has
a fundamental Identity: the creature of God, and by grace, his
child and heir to eternallife." 39
While the appeals court in Romeo ruled in favor of the
university, it did not paint with a broad brush. Even though a
nondiscrimination provision (that included sexual orientation)
in a student handbook might not be considered the basis of a
unilateral
contract
for
purposes
of enforcing the
nondiscrimination provision against a religious university,
such would not necessarily be the case in an employment
handbook. The Romeo appeals court found that, in the absence
of
a
language
indicating
a
religious
employer's
nondiscrimination employment provision is not binding, "a
manual's provisions on job security constitutes a binding
contract between the employer and the employee .... A policy
manual that provides for job security grants an important,
fundamental protection for workers. If such a commitment is
indeed made, obviously an employer should be required to
honor it." 40 Thus, in a state such as New Jersey that exempts
religious colleges and universities from its state law
nondiscrimination statute, a college or university employee

nonacademic, curricular or extracurricular, because of race, color, religion, age,
national origin, gender, sexual orientation, handicap and disability, or veteran's
status." /d. at 1016.
::!6. /d. at 1049.
::!7. !d. at 1050.
:~s. I d.
::!9. /d.
10. /d. at 1018.
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handbook that prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation would be sufficient to constitute an enforceable
contract. One could reasonably anticipate that, if a religious
college or university included sexual orientation in its
nondiscrimination provision and then sought to deny benefits
to same-sex married employees that were available to oppositesex married employees, or otherwise sought to discharge a
current employee who had recently entered into a same-sex
marriage, the statutory exemption would no longer apply to the
religious educational institution. 41
Most states also have nondiscrimination statutes similar to
Title VII with a provision, such as the one in the case at the
beginning of this section, prohibiting discrimination on the
basis of marital status. In Parker-Bigaback u. St. Labre
School, 42 the Supreme Court of Montana interpreted its
marital status provision as not applying to the school's
termination of a teacher living with a man not at that time her
husband 43 in violation of Catholic religious beliefs. The school's
employment contract contained a provision not addressing
marriage directly but declaring that employees agreed
[t]o conform to and abide by all of the moral and religious
teachings and beliefs of the Roman Catholic Church and not
to engage in any personal conduct or lifestyle which would be
at variance with or contrary to the policies of the school and
the Diocese of Great Falls-Billings or the moral and religious
teachings of the Roman Catholic Church. 44

In resolving the case in favor the school, the Montana
Supreme Court determined that "[t]his case is not about
marital status or gender. It is about conduct which [the

11. But see Egan v. Hamline United Methodist Chur~h. 679 N.W.2d cl50 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2004) (finding, in a case not involving marriage, that Minnesota's
nondiscrimination statute's religious exemption applied to discharge of gay organist,
and determining that the church's Personnel Handbook prohibiting discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation did not constitute a waiver of the statutory exemption,
the appeals court reasoning that such a result avoided an Establishment Clause
problem). For another case involving Minnesota's Human Rights Act and reaching the
same ~onclusion as Egan, see Thorson v. Billy Graham Evangelistic Ass'n, 6il7 N.W.2d
652 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
42. 7 P.3d 361 (Mont. 2000).
13. The facts in the case arc not clear, but apparently plaintiff was married to her
husband from 1974 to 1984 and remarried him in 1995 after her termination. Thus,
plaintiff appeared to have been living with her former husband at the time of her
termination even though they were divor~ed. See id. at :l6:i.
44. !d. at :l63-64.
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employee] agreed to avoid when she signed her employment
agreement with St. Labre School."45 By deftly shifting the issue
from marital status to adulterous conduct, the court
determined that whether the employee was married or single
"made no difference .... If she had cohabited with someone of
the opposite sex to whom she was not married, the same result
would have occurred."46
Judicial recognition in Vigars and Parker-Bigaback of a
religious claim to support employee termination for adultery
finds some traction in states that still continue to criminalize
adultery. 47 However, as applied to same-sex relationships the
statutes may be subject to ambiguity in interpretation or, even
more seriously, to the law of unintended consequences. For
example, the state of North Dakota declares that "[a] married
person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor if he or she engages
in a sexual act with another person who is not his or her
spouse,"48 but does not specify whether a spouse must be a
person of a different gender. Oklahoma defines adultery as the
"the unlawful voluntary sexual intercourse of a married person

45. /d. at 364.
16. /d.
17. See, e.g., Alabama: ALA. CollE§ JilA-13-2 (2005) ("A person commits adultery
when he engages in sexual intercourse with another person who is not his spouse and
lives in cohabitation with that other person when he or that other person is married"
can be punished under a Class B misdemeanor.); Georgia: GA. CoDE ANN. § 16-6-19
(2007) ("A married person commits the offense of adultery when he voluntarily has
sexual intercourse with a person other than his spouse" can be punished with a
misdemeanor.); Illinois: 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-7 (2010) ("Any person who has
sexual intercourse with another not his spouse commits adultery, if the behavior is
open and notorious, and (1) The person is married and the other person involved in
such intercourse is not his spouse; or (2) The person is not married and knows that the
other person involved in such intercourse is married" can be punished under a Class A
misdemeanor.); Maryland: MD. CODE ANN., CRJM. LAW § 10-501 (LexisNexis 2009)
(declaring that "A person may not commit adultery" and upon being found guilty of the
misdemeanor of adultery the person "shall be fined $10"); New Hampshire: N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 615::3 (2007) ("A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if, being a
married person, he engages in sexual intercourse with another not his spouse or, being
unmarried, engages in sexual intercourse with another known by him to he married.");
Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7- lOil (LexisNexis 2008) ("A married person commits
adultery when he voluntarily has sexual intercourse with a person other than his
spouse [and is guilty of] a class B misdemeanor."); Virginia: VA. CoDE ANN.§ 18.2<365
(2009) ("Any person, being married, who voluntarily shall have sexual intercourse with
any person not his or her spouse shall he guilty of adultery, punishable as a Class 4
misdemeanor."); Wisconsin: WIS. STAT. § 911.16 (2005) (finding a first class felony for
"[aj married person who has sexual intercourse with a person not the married person's
spouse; or [aj person who has sexual intercourse with a person who is married to
another").
18. N.D. CENT. COllE§ 12.1-20-09 (1997).
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with one of the opposite sex,"49 language suggesting that samesex partners married in another state who engage in same-sex
sexual conduct in the state of Oklahoma could not be
prosecuted for adultery. The effect of these statutes, one can
argue, is that while they provide some insight into a public
policy of fidelity in marriage, they should not take the place of
religious institutions creating their own definitions of
marriage. 50

IV. RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Where the religion-based claims of religious educational
institutions are not protected by state nondiscrimination
statutes, the ultimate question is whether the institutions are
entitled to protect their religious beliefs under federal
constitutional provisions. The most frequently litigated
constitutional protections are all found in the First
Amendment: 5 1 Free Exercise of Religion Clause, Establishment
Clause, and the Free Speech Clause (including right of
expressive association).
Federal courts have uniformly held an inquiry can be made
into whether a religious educational institution's claim that its
discrimination is consistent with its religious beliefs or whether
the claim Is pretextual. 52 However, even if alleged

19. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 871 (2002). Less clear is South Carolina's statute
declaring that "[a]ny man or woman who shall be guilty of the crime of adultery or
fornication shall be liable to indictment and, on conviction, shall he severally punished
by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars or
imprisonment for not less than six months nor more than one year or by both fine and
imprisonment. at the discretion of the court." S.C. Com: i\NN. § 16-15-60 (2009).
50. Other state statutes touch upon the benefits associated with marriage
without defining the nature of the marriage partners. See Godfrey v. Spano, 892
N.Y.S.2d 272 (N.Y. 2009) (upholding state executive order recognizing out-of-state
same-sex marriages for purposes of qualifying for public health insurance coverage and
other benefits); Lewis v. N.Y. State Dep't of Civil Serv., 872 N.Y.S.2d 578 (N.Y. i\pp.
Div. 2009) (refusing to find recognition of same-sex marriages from other states as
violating New York policies, including that same-sex marriages were not so abhorrent
to New York public policy as to fall into exception including incestuous and polygamous
marriages which would prohibit application of marriage recognition rule).
51. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press .... ").
52. See Geary v. Visitation of the Blessed Virgin Mary Parish Sch .. 7 F.:ld :324 (:3d
Cir. 1993) (finding no violation of the Religion Clauses where a limited inquiry under
the i\ge Discrimination in ~;mployment i\ct (29 U.S.C. § 62:3 (2010)) was made to
determine whether firing a teacher who had been dismissed for marrying contrary to
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discrimination is consistent with its religious beliefs, a court
can still determine that compelling public policy arguments
supersede application of the religious beliefs. 53
The U.S. Supreme Court's odyssey in balancing
nondiscrimination with religious beliefs has resulted in
benchmarks that suggest diminished protection for religious
beliefs. In Reynolds u. United States, 54 the Court articulated a
belief-practice dichotomy in upholding a criminal bigamy
conviction for a person who had alleged that his religious
beliefs permitted polygamy. 55 In a sweeping statement, the
Court opined that "[l]aws are made for the government of
actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious
belief and opinions, they may with practices." 56 As a result, the
Court reasoned that "it is within the legitimate scope of the
power of every civil government to determine whether
polygamy or monogamy shall be the law of social life under its
dominion" 57 and, just as government can prohibit religious
practices such as human sacrifices and wives burning
themselves on the funeral pyre of their husbands, so also can
government prohibit polygamy. 58 To allow a person to practice
his religious beliefs in all situations would have the effect of
"permit[ting] every citizen to become a law unto himself." 59
One hundred five years after Reynolds, the Court was
called upon to determine whether the Internal Revenue Service
could revoke the tax exempt status for a religious university, 60
Bob Jones University, 61 whose religious beliefs prohibited

Canon Law had been done according to religious beliefs or was pretextual); DeMarco v.
Holy Cross High Sch., 1 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding no Establishment Clause
violation in applying ADEA to religious school).
5:3. See Nat'! Relations Labor Bd. v. Catholic Bishop, 110 U .8. 490 (1979) (setting
forth a framework for analyzing whether federal statutes apply to religious educational
institutions and, if so, whether the statute can be applied even considering
constitutional claims).
51. 98 U.S. 115 (1878).
55. /d. at 161.
5G. /d. at 166.
57. /d.
58. /d.
59. /d. at 167.
60. Rev. Rul. 71-117, 1971-2 C.B. 2:30. The IRS News Release both denied tax
exempt status to the university and declared that donations to the university would not
be considered to be chartable for purposes of tax deductions.
61. 161 U.S. 571 (1983).
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interracial dating and marriage. 62 In upholding revocation of
the university's tax-exempt status, the Supreme Court opined
that religious practices could be denied protection where a
"most fundamental national public policy" was at stake. 63
Similar to the government's interest in Reynolds in
criminalizing the practice of polygamy, the government's
"fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating racial
discrimination in education" 64 in Bob Jones University was so
supportive of an overwhelming public policy that for the Court
to have reached any other conclusion would have undercut the
Court's determination in Brown v. Board of Education 65 "that
racial discrimination in education violates a most fundamental
national public policy." 66 The effect of Bob Jones University is
much broader than an educational institution's tax exempt
status; the decision reinforces Reynolds that the enforceability
of religious beliefs can be overridden by public policy concerns.
The prominence of public policy in countering religious
beliefs was examined four years after Bob Jones University in
Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown University Law Center v.
Georgetown University. 67 In Georgetown University, the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals, relying on Bob Jones University
held that "the District of Columbia [had] a compelling or
overriding governmental interest in the eradication of sexual
orientation discrimination" 68 and in finding that the University
had violated the District's nondiscrimination statute in
refusing to recognize a gay and lesbian student group. The
court of appeals determined that the University's Catholic
"moral norms," which distinguished between recognizing

62. See id. at 580-81.
There is to be no interracial dating
1. Students who are partners in an interracial marriage will ilP expellc>d.
2. Students who are members of or affiliated with any group or organization which
holds as one of its goals or advocates interracial marriage will be expelled.
:3. Students who date outside their own race will he expelled.
4. Students who espouse, promote, or encourage others to violate the University's
dating rules and regulations will he expelled.
6i3. !d. at 59:3.
61. ld. at 601.
65. :317 U.S. 183 (1954).
66. !d. at 59il (see Court's iteration of cases and statutes eradicating race
discrimination).
67. 536 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1987).
68. !d. at 32. See D.C. CODE§ 2-1401.01(2001) (prohibiting discrimination, among
other categories, for "marital status, . . . sexual orientation, gender identity or
expression ... ").
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homosexual conduct (which it found objectionable) and
homosexual orientation (which it did not find objectionable),
would not be burdened by recogmzmg the student
organization. 69 However, while the court of appeals held that
the University could be required to provide the facilities and
services available to other student organizations/ 0 any effort to
compel the University to "endorse" the gay/lesbian student
groups would violate the Free Exercise and Free Speech
Clauses. 71 In language reminiscent of Reynolds, the District of
Columbia Circuit observed that "government is without power
to intrude into the domain of the intellect or the spirit and that
only conduct may be regulated." 72
Both Reynolds and Bob Jones University viewed public
policy through the protective lens of Free Exercise Clause.
Although public policy prevailed in Reynolds and Bob Jones
University, the Free Exercise Clause still became an effective
counterweight in other cases involving religious beliefs and
education. 73 However, the vitality and viability of the Free
Exercise Clause came largely came to an end in 1990 in
Employment Division v. Smith. 74 In this case, the Supreme
Court upheld denial of unemployment compensation benefits to
two state employees who had been dismissed for using a
prohibited substance, peyote, allegedly during a Native
American religious ceremony. 75 In rejecting the former
employees' benefits claim under the Free Exercise Clause, the
Court acknowledged that exercise of religion applied "not only
[to] belief and profession but the performance of (or abstention

69. !d. at 18.
70. See id. at :31 (the court of appeals acknowledges the University's "all or
nothing'" position that applied both to endorsement and facilities/services while later
noting that the latter could be provided without requiring the former).
71. !d. at 21.
72. !d.
73. See Wis. v. Yoder, 106 U.S. 205 (1972). In upholding exemption for Amish
children from compulsory attendance past grade eight, the Supreme Court observed
that "courts must move with great circumspection in performing the sensitive and
delicate task of weighing a State's legitimate social concern when faced with religious
claims for exemption from generally applicable education requirements." !d. at 285.
74. 491 U.S. 872 (1990). For an early discussion of the dramatic impact of this
case on the application of the Free Exercise Clause, see generally Ralph Mawdsley,

l<Jmployment Division v. Smith Revisited: The Constriction of the Free Exercise Rights
Under the U.S. Constitution, 76 ED. LAW REP. 1 (1992).
75. Emp't /Jiu., 191 U.S. at 88il.
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from) physical acts." 76 However, in a sweeping decision, the
Court took its decisions in Reynolds and Bob Jones University
one step further and determined that free exercise of religion
would no longer be a viable defense when dealing with "a
neutral, generally applicable law." 77 After Employment
Division, the Court recognized that Free Exercise Clause would
have legal vitality only in two situations: where combined with
another constitutional provision such as the Free Speech
Clause or when dealing with facts demonstrating hostility
towards religion. 7X
Three years after Employment Division, the Supreme Court
furnished, in Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free
School District, 79 a replacement for the Free Exercise Clause,
holding that religious speech is a fully protected subset under
the Free Speech Clause. For the Court in Lamb's Chapel, the
Free Speech Clause's prohibition of viewpoint discrimination
became a powerful force in upholding religious beliefs.
However, the Supreme Court's decision in Christian Legal
Society Chapter of the University of California, Hastings
College of the Law v. Martinez (CLS)xo has cast a shadow over
meaning of viewpoint discrimination. The Court was called
upon to determine whether the law school's nondiscrimination
requirement for student organizations violated the free speech
and associational rights of the Christian Legal Society student
organization that sought to limit membership to persons
subscribing to its religious beliefs. 81 The law school's policy
prohibited discrimination in a broad number of categories,
including "sexual orientation"x 2 and required that "registered

76. !d. at 877.

77. !d. at 881.
78. See. e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu i\ye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520 (1993) (invalidating city ordinances prohibiting ritual slaughter of animals, finding
the ordinances to be neither neutral nor of general applicability and finding them to be
targeted at religious activity).
79. 508 U.S. 381, ::393 (199:3) (holding that a school district "discriminatl'[dJ on the
basis of viewpoint to permit school property to be used for the presentation of all views
about family issues and child rearing except those dealing with the subject matter from
a religious standpoint").
80. 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).
81. ld. at 2980-81.
82. !d. at 2979 ("[Hastings] shall not discriminate unlawfully on the basis of race,
color, religion, national origin, ancestry, disability, age, sex or sexual orientation. This
nondiscrimination policy covers admission, access and treatment in Hastingssponsored programs and activities.").
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student organizations allow any student to participate, become
a member, or seek leadership positions in the organization,
regardless of [her] status or beliefs. X.> In contrast to the Law
School's "all-comers policy," 84 the CLS bylaws
required members and officers to sign a "Statement of Faith"
and to conduct their lives in accord with prescribed principles.
Among those tenets is the belief that sexual activity should
not occur outside of marriage between a man and a woman.
CLS interprets its bylaws to exclude from affiliation anyone
who engages in "unrepentant homosexual conduct" or holds
religious convictions different from those in the Statement of
Faith.xs

The effect of CLS being denied law school sponsorship was
that, while it could use law school facilities for meetings and
activities, access to chalkboards, and availability of bulletin
boards to announce events, 86 it was denied access to a wide
range of services, including financial assistance from the law
school to subsidize events, use of law school channels to
communicate with students, placing of announcements in a
weekly Office of Student Affairs newsletter, use of the law
school logo, and participation in a student organizations fair
designed to advance recruitment efforts. 87
Choosing to merge the Supreme Court's separate lines of
free speech rights 8 x and associational right 89 cases, the CLS
sa. /d. at 2982.
84. /d. at 2982 n.5.
85. /d. at 2974. CLS is a national organization that imposes the same religious
requirements on all law school CLS chapters. On the organization's webpage, the CLS
Board of Directors has adopted a Resolution amending its Statement of Faith on "Faith
and Sexual Morality Standards"; however, this amendment currently can be accessed
only by its members. CHHISTIAN LEGAL SOCJF:TY, http://www.clsnet.org (last visited
Sept. 1. 2010).
86. CLS, 1:!0 S. Ct. at 2981.
87. /d. at 2979. The Court minimiws the impact of denying these benefits to CLS
in that "students [can] communicate through email, websites, and hosts like MySpace."
/d. at 2991.
88. For three key cases relying on free expression, see Bd. of Regents of Univ. of
Wis. System v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000) (finding facially invalid university
policy permitting student groups to be defunded on the basis of a student vote);
J{osenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (finding
impermissible viewpoint discrimination when university refused to provide the same
printing privileges to a student religious group that it had provided to nonreligious
student !,'TOups); Widmar v. Vincent, 151 U.S. 26::3 (1981) (invalidating university
refusal to permit student religious group to meet on university premises on the basis of
a university policy refusing religious groups to meet).
89. See Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 5:30 U.S. 610 (2000) (holding, on an as

--
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majority found the College of Law's all-comers policy to be
"reasonable and viewpoint neutral." 90 In response to the CLS
claim "[t]here can be no diversity of viewpoints in a forum if
groups are not permitted to form around viewpoints," 91 the
Court responded that a state restriction on a limited public
forum "need not be the most reasonable or the only reasonable
limitation." 92 Once the Court found that the law school's
refusal to recognize CLS was reasonable, the student
organization's free expression claim ceased to be viable under
Employment Diuision. 93 While the Court declared that "[i]t is,
after all, hard to imagine a more viewpoint-neutral policy than
one requiring all student groups to accept all comers," 94 the
Court remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit to determine
whether the Law School had "selectively enforce[d] its allcomers policy." 95

V. ANALYSIS
As suggested by the above discussion, the definition of
marriage in religious educational institutions has been framed
by federal and state courts striving to navigate a path between
protecting religious beliefs and implementing public policy
prohibiting discrimination. In Varnum u. Brien, 96 the Supreme
Court of Iowa invalidated a state statute prescribing that
"[o]nly a marriage between a male and a female is valid." 97
Examining the statute under the Iowa Constitution's equal
privileges and immunities provision, 98 the state supreme court
applied basis, that state nondiscrimination statute prohibiting sexual orientation
discrimination violated Doy Scouts right of expressive association).
90. CLS, 1:30 S. Ct. at 299::i.
91. Jd. at 2992.
92. Id. (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 17:3 U.S.
788, 808 (1985)).
9;3. ld. at 2995.
91. !d. at 299;3.
95. Id. at 2995. For example, the CLS queried whether student groups formed on
the basis of race (African American), ethnicity (Hispanic), or gender (women) would
also be open to full participation by non-blacks, non- Hispanics, or men. Sec Appellant
Brief at 8-9, CLS Chapter of Hastings Law Sch. v. Martinez. 1ao S. Ct. 2971 (2010)
(No. 08-1371) for the CLS view on the Law School's failure to enforce its all comers
policy uniformly.
96. 76;3 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
97. lOWA COllE§ 595.2(1) (2009).
98. lOWA CONST. art. 1, § () ("[Tjhe General Assembly shall not grant to any
citizen, or class of citi7-ens, privileges or immunities, which, upon the same terms shall
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applied an intermediate level heightened scrutiny under a
quasi-suspect standard, 99 finding that the statute furthered
"deep-seated prejudice rather than legislative rationality in
pursuit of some legitimate objective," 100 was based on
"irrelevant stereotypes and prejudice," 101 was not the kind of
human trait so "highly resistant to change ... [that] it allowed
courts to relax their standard of review because the barrier is
temporary or susceptible to self-help," 102 and addressed a group
politically powerless to effect changes in the law. 103
Same-sex marriage clearly has become the legal
frontispiece for discussing sexual orientation issues in general.
A statutory or judicial pronouncement on homosexualityrelated areas of sexual orientation or marriage is likely to leave
some religious educational institutions uncertain as to the

not equally belong to all citizens.").
99. Sec United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (in adapting the heightened
scrutiny standard to the constitutionality of the Commonwealth of Virginia's refusal to
admit women to the Virginia Military Institute, the Court determined that the
Commonwealth had failed to satisfy the "exceedingly persuasive justification" test in
order to uphold its admission policy). See also In reMarriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 44415 (Cal. 2008) (Supreme Court of California, in invalidating state statute stating that
"only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California [CAL.
FAM. CODE § 308.5 (2001)]," held that classification based on sexual orientation was
subject to "strict scrutiny analysis"); Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407,
1:32 (Conn. 2008) ("[Wje conclude that, as a minority group that continues to suffer the
enduring effects of centuries of legally sanctioned discrimination, laws singling them
out for disparate treatment are subject to heightened judicial scrutiny to ensure that
those laws are not the product of such historical prejudice and stereotyping."). But see,
Conaway v. Deane, 9:32 A.2d 571, 609, 616 (Md. 2007) (while holding state statutes
prohibiting same-sex marriages to be unmnstitutional, state supreme court held "that
gay and lesbian persons [were not] so politically powerless that they constitute a
suspect [or quasi-suspect] class").
100. Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 890. But see Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.:ld 963
(Wash. 2006) (in upholding state's Defense of Marriage Act [DOMA], the state supreme
court found that DOMA was rationally related to state's interests in procreation and
children's well-being, and thus did not violate the privileges and immunities clause).
101. Varnum, 76:3 N.W.2d at 890. For other jurisdictions adopting the same
position, see In re Marriage Cases, 18:3 at 415 ("we conclude that in the present
context, affording same-sex couples access only to the separate institution of domestic
partnership, and denying such couples access to the established institution of
marriage, properly must be viewed as impinging upon the right of those couples to
have their family relationship accorded respect and dignity equal to that accorded the
family relationship of opposite-sex couples").
102. Varnum, 76;) N.W.2d at 891.
10:3. ld. at 895 (We are convinced gay and lesbian people are not so politically
powerful as to overcome the unfair and severe prejudice that history suggests produces
discrimination based on sexual orientation. Gays and lesbians certainly possess no
more political power than women enjoyed four decades ago when the Supreme Court
began subjecting gender-based legislation to closer scrutiny.).
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status of their religious beliefs. The notion that
nondiscrimination statutes may have exemptions for religious
beliefs is comforting only if the exemption is broad enough to
include the full range of those beliefs. The challenge with
statutory exemptions is that they are subject to legislation
manipulation. In Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints u. Amos, 104 the U.S. Supreme
Court upheld, against an Establishment Clause challenge, the
broadening of a Title VII exemption 105 that permitted the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints to extend its
temple recommend requirement 106 to employees in entities
owned by the church even though those employees did not
engage in religious activities. Presumably, if Congress had
moved in the opposite direction to change the Title VII's
exemption from all activities to only religious activities, the
church's religious beliefs would have been adversely affected to
some extent.
Similar issues relate to students. If a federal funding
statute were enacted prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation, would the religious beliefs of religious
institutions opposing homosexuality or same-sex marriage be
enforceable? Could the institutions punish students (or faculty)
expressing views in opposition to religious beliefs and proscribe
faculty or student organizations opposing the organization's
religious views? The difficulty is that, in the absence of a
statutory exemption permitting religious schools and
universities to enforce otherwise discriminatory rules,
nondiscrimination statutes, one can argue, would prevail over
statements of religious beliefs because, as reflected in
Employment Division and CLS, such statutes would be
generally applicable and viewpoint neutral.

101. 18:3 U.S. :327 (1987).
105. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a) (1972), where Title VII exempts from coverage the
employment by religious organizations of persons of a particular religion who are
required to carry out the organization's "activities" (amended language) rather than
just "religious activities" (old language), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a) (1961).
106. As explained by the Court, a temple recommend is a "certificate that [a person
is] a member of the Church and eligible to attend its temples .... Temple recommends
are issued only to individuals who ohserve the Church's standards in such matters as
regular church attendance, tithing, and abstinence from coffee, tea, alcohol, and
tobacco." Amos, 18:3 U.S. at :327, :3:30 n.4.
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The fundamental constitutional challenge to implementing
religious beliefs is grounded in the belief- practice doctrine of
Reynolds. To suggest, as Reynolds would have us believe, that
beliefs and practices are two equally balanced sides of a
religious institution's statement of its religious beliefs is
disingenuous. Religion takes form and shape only to the extent
that it can be practiced. The notion that government should be
able to regulate the practice of religion because it does not
probe into persons' minds to change their religious thoughts is
proverbial strawman logic. We are led to believe that
government restriction of religious practices is reasonable
because it affects only one side of the equation.
However, one can argue that too much legal water has
flowed over the regulatory dam to change the rules in place to
deal with discrimination and religious beliefs. The legal
legacies of Reynolds, Bob Jones University, Employment
Division, and CLS have served to frame the law, suggesting
that religious beliefs will have limited impact in defining the
discrimination debate.
The dialogue between endorsement and facilitation as
reflected in CLS and Georgetown University contain the seeds
of future and, to date, yet unresolved legal disputes. In
Georgetown University, the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals, in directing the university to provide services and
facilities to a gay and lesbian rights group, declared that
"nothing can penetrate the constitutional shield protecting
against official coercion to remove a religious belief or to
endorse a principle opposed to that belief." 107 One wonders,
though, how much assurance a religious educational institution
can have that permitting same-sex advocates on campus will
still allow the institution to declare its beliefs on
homosexuality. Would allowing chaplains and pastors to teach
and preach the institution's dogma in chapel services and in
religion courses concerning the sinfulness of homosexuality be
treated as a form of harassment or retaliation? If so, does such
an outcome reflect the futility and folly of the belief-practice
doctrine?

107. Gay Rights Coal. of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v. Georgetown Univ., 586
A.2d 1, 25(D.C.1987).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Same-sex marriage is a high stakes debate, but one cannot
help but wonder why, if so much is at stake in terms of
religious beliefs, so little has been affirmed by religious
educational institutions. However, even if religious schools and
universities have clear statements on marriage and religious
beliefs, one wonders whether those beliefs, in the end, will
prevail. Should federal protection against sexual orientation
discrimination be adopted, thus joining existing laws in many
states, municipalities and public educational institutions
protecting against sexual orientation and marital status
discrimination, the refusal to recognize same-sex marriages
will be difficult to sustain. Once sexual orientation acquires
protected status, to substitute terms such as civil union for
marriage is, one can argue, simply another way of perpetuating
discrimination.
The same-sex marriage and religious beliefs debate has
moved forward on three interrelated fronts. First, and most
broadly, if federal legislation prohibits discrimination based on
sexual orientation, should a religious exemption be granted for
religious beliefs that oppose homosexuality? If so, should the
exemption apply to all aspects of the issue-hiring and
discharge of gay/lesbian employees, admission or expulsion of
gay/lesbian students, admission or expulsion of children of
gay/lesbian couples, discipline of employees or students
espousing gay/lesbian rights even if not gay or lesbian
themselves? The Bob Jones University case suggests that
creation of a fundamental protected status for may leave little
room to invoke religious beliefs in opposition to that status.
Second, punishment of sexual activity outside marriage, to
the extent that different-sex partners are treated the same as
same-sex partners, would seem to be a safe harbor. However,
the implications of punishing sexual activity for same-sex
partners are significantly different, because, while different-sex
partners have a reference point for legitimizing sexual conduct
(marriage), such would not be the case for same-sex persons. In
effect, is marriage for same-sex partners being treated as a
form of sexual misconduct, thus requiring that homosexual
persons maintain a life of celibacy, and would such a
requirement be defensible under nondiscrimination statutes?
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Third, a religious educational institution's decision to
punish a same-sex relationship as a marriage can be a slippery
slope. If the institution lacks a religious belief regarding
marriage, one can question whether the subject is really a
matter of a sincerely held religious belief. However, publishing
a religious belief opposing same-sex marriage could serve to
increase both the institution's visibility and vulnerability to
litigation. If sexual orientation receives federal protected status
comparable to race and gender, one can speculate whether
denying marriage status to same-sex partners will simply be
treated as a form of discrimination that depreciates the
protected status of sexual orientation. 108
Almost forty years ago, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 109 the Amish
prevailed in acqmrmg an exemption from the state's
compulsory attendance statute under the First Amendment's
Free Exercise Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment's Liberty
Clause right to direct their children's education. The Court
reasoned
that
"[t]he
values
underlying these
two
[constitutional] provisions relating to religion have been
zealously protected, sometimes even at the expense of other
interests of admittedly high social importance." 110 As stunning
as the Yoder case was at the time, 111 it was limited to "the
traditional way of life of the Amish [that was] not merely a
matter of personal preference, but one of deep religious
conviction, shared by an organized group, and intimately
related to daily living." 112 One can argue that nothing in the
debate concerning sexual orientation, premarital sexual
activity, or same-sex marriage rises to the level of the
protection accorded the Amish way of life in Yoder, and, in light
of the post- Yoder cases of Bob Jones University, Employment
Division, and CLS, any constitutional protection for religious
beliefs opposing same-sex marriage seems doubtful. To quote
the great religious liberty advocate William Bentley Ball:

108. For a South African perspective, see Minister of Home Affairs u. Fourie 2006
(:l) BCLR :l55 (CC) (declaring that, under the South Africa Constitution prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, partners in same-sex unions are
entitled to have union recognized as a valid marriage).
109. 106 U.S. 205 (1972).
110. /d.at211.
111. See Douglas W. Kmiec, A Review J.;.ssay of Mere Creatures of the State?
l~ducation, Rclif{ion, and the Courts: A View from the Courtroom, 70 Nonm DAME L.
REV. 1217, 1268-72 (1995).
112. Yoder, 106 U.S. at 216.

